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Abstract
This paper provides microeconomic evidence on the variation over time of the ￿rm-speci￿c
wage premium in Spain from 1995 to 2002, and its impact on wage inequality. We make use
of two waves of a detailed linked employer-employee data set. In addition, a new data set with
￿nancial information on ￿rms is used for 2002 to control as ￿ exibly as possible for di⁄erences in the
performance of ￿rms (aggregated at industry level). To our knowledge, there is no microeconomic
evidence on the dynamics of the ￿rm-speci￿c wage premium for Spain or for any other country
with a similar institutional setting. Our results suggest that there is a clear tendency towards
centralization in the collective bargaining process in Spain over this seven-year period, that the
￿rm-level contract wage premium undergoes a substantial decrease, particularly for women, and
￿nally that the "centralization" observed in the collective bargaining process has resulted in a
slight decrease in wage inequality.
Keywords: Firm-level contracts, Matched employer-employee data, wage inequality.
11 Introduction
Several recent papers have analized the e⁄ects of unions on the wage structure by
comparing wages in unionized and non-unionized labor markets. Most of the empirical
evidence refers to Anglo-Saxon countries1 because there the non-unionized sector repre-
sents a suitable counterfactual. However, most European countries are not characterized
by "closed shop" labor markets and collective bargaining agreements extend rather to
unionized and non-unionized workers. Furthermore in some European countries, such as
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, collective bargaining takes place simultaneously at ￿rm
level and sectoral level (on regional and national scales). Firm-speci￿c contracts usually
override the prevailing sectoral agreements and provide an opportunity for workers to
improve the labor conditions attained at more centralized levels. Thus, the relevant
question in these European countries is not how unionized and non-unionized labor mar-
kets compare, but rather how more and less centralized collective bargaining systems
compare.
In this setting, there are many macroeconometric studies that analyze the e⁄ect of
wage contracting centralization on the economic performance of a country, though no
clear conclusion has been reached. For instance, Bruno and Sachs (1985) and Jimeno
(1992) support the hypothesis of a linear relationship between centralization and macro
results while Calmfors and Dri¢ l (1988) defend the inverted-U shape with centralized
and decentralized economies both performing better than their intermediate competi-
tors. However, there is much less microeconometric evidence on how the level of con-
tracting a⁄ects the structure of wages, due in part to the lack of suitable data. Several
authors have found a statistically signi￿cant premium associated with ￿rm-level contract-
ing. Dell￿ Aringa and Lucifora (1994) ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of this type of contracting on
wages for a sample of manufacturing plants in Italy. Card and de la Rica (2006) ￿nd
that ￿rm-level contracting is associated in Spain with a 5-10% wage premium. On the
other hand, Hartog, Leuven and Teulings (2002) ￿nd no premium for the Netherlands.
This paper provides microeconomic evidence on the variation over time of the ￿rm-
speci￿c wage premium in Spain from 1995 to 2002, and its impact on wage inequality.
1See for instance, Lewis (1986) who concludes that the average union e⁄ect on wages is positive in
the US. See Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2002) for a study of the e⁄ect of unions on the wage structure
of Canada, the UK and the US. Hirsch (2003) also ￿nds higher premiums after correcting for estimation
biases.
2We make use of two waves of a detailed linked employer-employee data set. In addition,
a new data set with ￿nancial information on ￿rms is used for 2002 to control as ￿ exibly
as possible for di⁄erences in the performance of ￿rms (aggregated at industry level). To
our knowledge, there is no microeconomic evidence on the dynamics of the ￿rm-speci￿c
wage premium for Spain or for any other country with a similar institutional setting.
Our results suggest that there is a clear tendency towards centralization in the collective
bargaining process in Spain over this seven-year period, that the ￿rm-level contract wage
premium undergoes a substantial decrease, particularly for women, and ￿nally that the
￿ centralization￿observed in the collective bargaining process contributes signi￿cantly to
the change in wage inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of
the major institutional aspects of the Spanish labor market in recent years. Section 3
brie￿ y describes the data used in the empirical analysis, presents some descriptives and
carries out a semiparametric procedure to analyze the impact of ￿rm-level contracting on
the distribution of wages as a whole. Section 4 describes the model of earnings used to
carry out the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical ￿ndings from the estimation of
the di⁄erent regression models, with sub-sections on changes in the premium by types of
worker, and compares OLS estimates with di⁄erent propensity score estimates. Section 6
analyzes how the centralization in collective agreements a⁄ects wage dispersion. Section
7 concludes the study with a summary of our ￿ndings.
2 Institutional Framework
During the Franco dictatorship the Spanish labor market was centralized and highly
regulated. Collective bargaining was already established through the old labor laws
(Ordenanzas Laborales). Legal trade unions and employers￿organizations negotiated
contracts but the State intervened directly to determine the outcomes of the negotiation
(Milner and Metcalf 1994). The post-Franco Spanish collective bargaining system is based
on principles resulting from the 1980 Workers￿Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores),
which was the result of a consensus between unions and employers￿organizations2. A
2See Bentolila and Jimeno (2002) for a description of the evolution of the legislation on collective
bargaining in Spain since the eighties and ValdØs dal RØ (2006) for a review of the 25 years of the
Workers￿Statute.
3system for the election of workers￿representatives was established in order to form work-
ers￿councils and negotiate issues such as productivity, wages and working hours. In this
context, the terms of the agreements reached were and still are legally binding on all
workers within the scope of the agreement. Thus, bargaining coverage is very high in
Spain, especially relative to the low union density. In 1995 union density was 19% but
81% of the work-force was covered. Both rates have decreased over time; in 2002 union
density was 14.9% and the agreements reached covered 72% of workers.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the slow economic growth of Spain since 1990
demonstrates the limits and the negative e⁄ects of the political measures on employ-
ment taken during the eighties. The worldwide recession that began in the early nineties
hit Spain around 1993. Unemployment increased considerably to 25% of working-age
population. In￿ ation also rose to the highest level of the decade. At that time, it be-
came necessary to encourage employment and promote collective bargaining, requiring
the attribution to the unions of a genuine function as a regulator of labor relations. The
reform of 1994 repealed the old labor laws, encouraging the use of contractual instru-
ments such as ￿rm-level contracts in order to decentralize bargaining (Toharia and Malo
1997). In both 1997 and 2001 social actors (employers and union representatives) signed
the Interconfederal Agreements on Collective Bargaining (Acuerdo Interconfederal de la
Negociaci￿n Colectiva), which were focused on increasing coordination in the collective
bargaining mechanism.
As from 1996 the economy started to recover, with the best period of expansion being
2000, when 5.0% growth was achieved. Employment started to increase and the in￿ ation
rate was stabilized3. After that a decreasing trend set in for the annual growth rate until
2002, when growth (2.7%) was basically the same as in 1995. Therefore, 1995 and 2002
are characterized by the same GDP growth rate but not by the same expectations; in
2002 the trend and the future prospects were clearly better than 7 years earlier.
An additional feature that must be noted regarding the general dynamics of the Span-
ish Labour market is the signi￿cant increase in the Female Labour Force Participation
from mid eighties onwards. The FLFP of women from 25 to 54 years old increased
from 35% in 1985 to 63% by 2002 (for comparison, Male Participation rate at that age
3In spite of the economic expansion in recent years Spain has not undergone a signi￿cant increase in
workers￿purchasing power, due in part to political measures to encourage employment but at the same
time restrain wages.
4range remained roughly constant at around 90%). The labour market could not absorb
this enormous increase in participation immediately and many women, particularly the
youngest ones, experienced very high unemployment rates until the end of the nineties.
Figure 1 describes the dynamics of unemployment rates by gender and age during the
period under study. As can be seen from this ￿gure, female unemployment rate of women
between 25-54 years decreased from 29% in 1995 to 15% in 2002. This led to an important
increase in female employment rates, which in turn implied changes in total composition
of the labour force, as it will be seen later.
For our analysis, in addition to a knowledge of the macroeconomic situation in Spain
we also need to analyze the dynamics of wage contracts from 1995 to 2002. Does the
labor market in Spain tend towards a decentralized wage setting or a centralized one?
The level of ￿rm collective bargaining measured as the number of workers a⁄ected by
￿rm-level contracting as a percentage of the total number of a⁄ected workers was stable
in the eighties (Milner and Metcalf 1994) but declined slightly at the beginning of the
nineties4.
Table 1 presents for 1995 and 2002 the total number of a⁄ected workers in total agree-
ments and in ￿rm-collective agreements by industry. Total number of a⁄ected workers
in total agreements increases in the three activities (industry, construction and services);
however, the percentage of workers a⁄ected by ￿rm-agreements decreases on average in
almost three percentage points. Firm-collective agreements coverage is highest in indus-
try followed by services, and coverage of ￿rm-level agreements in the construction sector
is almost negligible. However, the percentage of workers covered by ￿rm agreements
in industry falls 3 percentage points in industry and more than 4 percentage points in
services. This feature reveals a clear tendency towards a more centralized wage setting
scheme over the seven year period.
As Disney, Gosling and Machin (1996) point out, an employer￿ s decision to accept
a ￿rm-speci￿c contract is comparable to the voluntary union recognition process in the
United Kingdom. The decline in the percentage of workers covered by ￿rm-speci￿c
agreements could be compared with the decrease in the unionization rate in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. For instance, Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) ￿nd de-unionization
in the US to be an important factor in explaining the rise in wage inequality during
4For a detailed description of collective bargaining in Spain, see Card and De la Rica (2006).
5the eighties. Related to this study, Gosling and Lemieux (2001) argue that the steeper
decline in unionization in the UK explains why wage inequality increased faster than in
the US. In section 6 we analyze how the decrease in the number of workers covered by
￿rm collective agreements a⁄ects wage inequality.
3 Data and Descriptives
The primary source of data for our analysis lies in the Spanish Structure of Earn-
ings Surveys (SES) of 1995 and 2002, large-sample surveys of wages, job information
and worker characteristics. These datasets consist of random samples of workers from
establishments with 10 or more employees in the private sector, which accounted for
approximately 70 percent of the working population in Spain in both 1995 and 2002 in
the manufacturing, construction, trade and service industries5. They are sampled in two
stages. In the ￿rst stage, establishments are selected randomly and strati￿ed by region
and size. In the second stage, a sample of workers from each of the selected establish-
ments is also randomly selected6. Moreover, in order to add ￿nancial information on the
establishments we use the Spanish Structural Business Statistics (SBS) survey and match
SES and SBS at the level of the 2-digit NACE industry because there is no information
available at establishment level. We add this information only for 2002 due to the lack
of ￿nancial data for 1995.
We focus on the subsample of full-time workers to ensure that our ￿ndings are com-
parable to those of other studies in the relevant literature. This gives a sample of 130,170
workers and 14,347 establishments for 1995 and a sample of 129,378 workers and 14,778
establishments for 2002. There is almost the same number of total observations in both
years but the percentage of ￿rm-speci￿c contracts is much lower in 2002, as mentioned
before (dropping from 23% to 10%). Since the structure of pay in Spain is similar under
regional and national contracts, as Card and de la Rica (2006) show using the EES-95,
we group the two together and concentrate on the di⁄erence between ￿rm-speci￿c and
5In 2002 there are also establishments in the ￿elds of education, health and social work, but we exclude
these from the sample for comparability reasons.
6An average of 5 workers are interviewed in establishments with 10-20 employees, 7 workers in es-
tablishments with 21-50 employees, 12 workers in establishments with 51-100 employees, 20 workers in
establishments with 100-200 employees, and 25 workers in establishments with more than 200 employees.
6sectoral contracts. Tables 2A, 2B and 2C present overall and gender weighted7 descrip-
tive statistics for the overall sample and for workers covered by the two di⁄erent levels
of contracts for each year.
The main features described in tables 2A-2C can be summarized as follows: Re-
garding workers￿characteristics, we can see that in 2002 workers are younger and more
educated, and this change is stronger in workers covered by ￿rm-level contracts com-
pared to workers covered by other contracts. When average workers￿characteristics are
dissagregated by gender (tables 2B and 2C), it can can observed that this compositional
change is mainly driven by the sample of women covered by ￿rm-level contracts: Whereas
in 1995 24% of women covered by ￿rm-level contracts were under 30 years old, by 2002
this percentage rises in 10 percentage points (whereas the proportion of women with
other than ￿rm contracts that are under 30 years decreases in 4 percentage points). The
increase in female educational level can be observed not only for those women with ￿rm
level contracts (the percentage of women with university studies rises from 15% to 23%)
but also for women covered by other contracts (from 9% to 15%). The increase in the
proportion of women with university studies more than doubles the one observed for
males.
If we look at the types of ￿rms that workers belong to by contract status, some
interesting features arise. On the one hand, workers with ￿rm-level contract work in the
largest establishments. This is particularly so in 2002, where 80% of women and 75% of
men with ￿rm-level contract belong to ￿rms that have over 200 workers (compared to
45% and 46% in 1995). Second, there is an overall change in the industry distribution
of ￿rms included in the sample. Whereas in 1995 65% of ￿rms in the sample belong to
manufacturing, by 2002 this percentage decreases to 48%. This decrease is compensated
with an increase of ￿rms that belong to services (mainly, trade, hotels and other services).
This change in industry distribution is particularly pronounced in ￿rms with ￿rm-level
contract.
The dependent variable for this analysis is the logarithm of the gross wage expressed
in euros per hour. Gross wage is de￿ned as the sum of the gross base wage and gross
wage complements. Base wages are determined from the corresponding contract by
7In our analysis we use sampling weights for each worker that re￿ ect the relative probabilities of
sample selection for di⁄erent establishments.
7occupation and category within a ￿rm, while wage complements are de￿ned as the set
of payments above the base wage, and include factors such as seniority as well as more
discretionary suplements such as incentives for productivity, attendance and punctuality
awarded to individual employees. Our measure does not include bonuses for nightshifts
or extraordinary payments8.
Tables 3 and 4 present the mean and standard deviation of log hourly wages for 1995
and 2002. Table 3 describes mean log wages and the standard deviation dissagregated
by gender, which shows the raw wage premium and its dynamics over this seven year
period. Table 4, on the other hand, describes average wages by workers￿characteristics
and type of contract, which allows us to better understand the dynamics of the wage
premium. The ￿rst two columns of table 3 show the unadjusted sample moments, while
columns (3) and (4) show adjusted moments obtained using the re-weighting technique of
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), which adjusts the sample for di⁄erences in observed
characteristics in such a way that the weighted distribution of skill characteristics is the
same in each sector as in the overall sample9. In order to measure wages in real terms,
2002 wages are de￿ ated to their 1995 value.
The information in table 3 gives us some indication of how mean wages and dispersion
vary from one contracting level to another over time. Regarding mean wages, we observe
that unadjusted mean wages are systematically higher in 2002, except for women covered
by ￿rm-speci￿c contracts. Average wages for women with ￿rm-level contracts decrease in
real terms over this seven year period. Furthermore, the raw ￿rm-speci￿c wage premium
increases from .32 to .34 for men, but it decreases by around 30% for women (from .34
to .23) over the seven-year period. Looking at the adjusted moments, we ￿nd that the
standardized wage premium decreases in 1 percentage point for men (from 0.11 to 0.10)
but it decreases in 6 percentage points for women (from 0.12 to 0.06). This di⁄erence in
the raw and standardized wage premium for men and women has to do with the change in
the composition of women belonging to ￿rms with ￿rm-level contracts. As we saw before,
comparing the sample of female workers with ￿rm-level contracts in 1995 and in 2002,
the latter women are much younger, their mean tenure has decreased to a great extent
8Generally, young men are more likely to have this kind of complement, so by including them in the
hourly wage we are making a distintion between groups of workers.
9The idea behind this semiparametric procedure is to allocate a lower weight to individuals who are
overrepresented in the subsample of workers covered by non ￿rm-speci￿c contracts and viceversa.
8(compared to men mean tenure), are working mainly in ￿rms with over 200 workers and
many of them work in trade and other services in detriment of manufacturing.
Table 4 presents mean wages by workers￿characteristics and type of contract to help
us understand the relationship between the change in the composition of women with
￿rm-level contracts and their decrease in real wages. It reveals, in the ￿rst place, that
wages of workers under 30 years old are the lowest ones and the ones that have experienced
the smallest increase. Second, wages of workers with university education are highest,
but on average their increase over this seven year period is almost negliglible. Third,
average wages of ￿rms with over 200 workers are the highest, but the wage increase is
lower than in other ￿rms for the period under study. Finally, wages in trade, hotels and
other services (where the proportion of women with ￿rm-level contracts has increased
considerably) are the lowest and have decreased over this period.
What about wage dispersion? Various issues emerge in regard to wage dispersion
from table 3: First, looking at all workers in 1995, it can be seen that wage variance
associated with ￿rm-speci￿c contracts is lower than variance of wages for workers with
other contracts. However, when we dissagregate by gender, we observe that this feature
arises as a result of a higher compression of wages of men with ￿rm-contracts relative to
other contracts. On the contrary, wages of women with ￿rm-speci￿c contracts are more
disperse than those of women with other contracts. If we look at the dynamics of wage
dispersion over this seven year period, we can see that (i) the overall variance for all
workers remains almost the same as in 1995, if anything, there is a very slight decrease,
(ii) wages of male workers with ￿rm contracts are, as in 1995, more compressed than
those with other contracts (although their dispersion has increased slightly), and (iii) the
dispersion of wages of women with ￿rm contracts has increased to a great extent, whereas
those of women with other contracts have remained at its 1995 level. This has led to a
signi￿cant increase in the dispersion of wages of women with ￿rm-level contracts relative
to women with other contracts. This result is similar to the ￿ndings of Card (2001) for
US women, when the dispersion of unionized and not unionized women is compared.
To give a better picture of the relationship between contract type and wages for
di⁄erent types of workers, Figures 2 and 3 plot mean log wages for men and women for
workers in di⁄erent age-education cells10 for the two periods. In doing this, we restrict
10Speci￿cally, workers are divided into 56 cells using eight age categories and seven education ranges.
9individual heterogeneity in observed skills (age and education) of workers covered by
di⁄erent types of contracts. If mean wages were the same in the two sectors for workers
with similar observed skills, the points would lie along the reference 45 degree line.
Examination of the graphs shows that wages are higher under ￿rm-level contracts than
under sectoral contracting in both periods for both men and women (as we saw in Table
3). Furthermore, the di⁄erence in average wages between workers with and without ￿rm
contracts is more disperse for more highly-skilled workers, particularly for highly-skilled
women.
Finally, to o⁄er a broader view of the dynamics of wage dispersion over the seven
year period by type of contract, Figures 4 and 5 plot the whole distribution of wages
for both periods by gender11. The two ￿gures plot both the actual and counterfactual
distributions. The latter is the distribution that would prevail in the absence of ￿rm-level
contracts. It is obtained using a procedure developed by Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux
(1996) and consists of a reweighting of the distribution of wages of workers covered by
non ￿rm-level contracts (See Appendix for further details). To carry out the analysis,
we focus on a general method for describing changes in the whole distribution of wages
such as kernel density estimates.
From the graphs it can be seen that ￿rm-level contracts tend to move the distribution
of wages rightwards for both men and women, particularly in 1995. This is consistent
with the higher average wage premium associated with ￿rm-level contracts in that year.
In fact, for 2002, the actual and counterfactual distributions of wages are almost identical.
To conclude, from this visual inspection, (i) there is a clear positive relationship between
￿rm-speci￿c contracts and wage levels in 1995, which decreases over the seven year period,
and (ii) there is no clear relationship between ￿rm-speci￿c contracts and wage dispersion
in any of the two periods under analysis.
Next, we look at wage estimation models to quantify the e⁄ect of ￿rm-speci￿c con-
tracts on wages and their dynamics over this seven year period. In the next section we
describe the econometric model used here to explain the wage determination process and
test the descriptive facts previously observed.
11Previous studies for the Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) have
shown that the e⁄ect of unions is best captured by modelling the whole distribution of wages.
104 The model
To quantify collective bargaining wage premiums, we consider a wage equation for
worker i at establishment j of the following form,
wij = ￿Xi + ￿j + ￿i + "ij (1)
where wij is the log hourly wage of individual i, Xi is a set of observed characteristics
of workers (such as age, education, job tenure and contract status) associated with a
vector of coe¢ cients ￿, ￿j represents the wage premium earned by workers due to their
belonging to establishment j, ￿i represents the unobserved characteristics of individual
i, such as ability. Finally, "ij is the error term, which is assumed to follow a normal
distribution. To model the e⁄ect of ￿rm-level contracting it is assumed that the wage
premium earned by workers at establishment j, that is, ￿j, depends on four factors: a
dummy variable for the presence of a ￿rm-speci￿c contract at the workplace (Fj), the
average characteristics of the workforce at the establishment (Xj), a vector of observed
chacacteristics of ￿rms (Zj) such as size and market orientation of products, and the
unobserved component of ￿rms (vj), e.g. their pro￿tability.
These assumptions lead to a model for individual wages of the following form,
wij = ￿Xi + ￿Fj + ￿Xj + ￿Zj + ￿i + vj + "ij (2)
The main focus of this paper is on estimating the impact of ￿rm-level contracting on
wages, ￿. Is OLS the most appropriate way to estimate that coe¢ cient in this context?
If ￿i and vj are uncorrelated with Fj, conditional on the observed worker and ￿rm
characteristics, ￿ can be consistently estimated by OLS applied to equation (2). But
generally, as pointed out by Lewis (1986), such estimates su⁄er from upward bias resulting
from the omission of unobserved variables correlated with contract status. If this is the
case, the estimation of ￿ by OLS will include the true e⁄ect as well as the bias factors
arising from both worker and ￿rm unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, the relevant question when estimating the ￿rm-level contract e⁄ect is how
to eliminate these biases. This would be easier if we had longitudinal data12, but alterna-
tive solutions can be found that exploit the advantages of our data, such as the availability
12See Blanch￿ ower (1999) for an estimation of the ￿xed e⁄ects of the union premium on wages.
11of information on the characteristics of co-workers (meaning workers in the same ￿rm
with the same occupation). If we assume that workers with higher unobserved ability
tend to have co-workers with higher average skill levels, some of the e⁄ects of unobserved
ability can be eliminated by controlling for average characteristics of co-workers.
In order to deal with the unobserved heterogeneity of ￿rms, we control for the full
set of observed ￿rm-level characteristics that determine the level of bargaining13. As
shown by Imbens (2004), if contract status is ignorable conditional on the observed
control variables, then conditioning on the probability that establishment j has a ￿rm-
level contract will eliminate any bias in the estimation of ￿ arising from the correlation of
contract status with ￿rm characteristics. To implement this idea, a probit model for the
probability of a ￿rm-level contract is ￿tted, the predicted probability is estimated and
then included as a polynomial function in the individual earnings equation. Using this
predicted probability all the relevant information is condensed into the one dimensional
propensity score.
5 Empirical estimation of the Firm-level contract premium
5.1 Standard regression models
Tables 4 and 5 present a series of individual regression models for men and women
respectively for the two years. The ￿rst model includes only a dummy variable which
takes value one if the worker is covered by a ￿rm-speci￿c contract. Column (2) incor-
porates observed worker and ￿rm characteristics such as age, education, contract status,
market orientation, ￿rm size and public ownership status of the ￿rm. Finally, the third
model also includes the average characteristics of co-workers at the same establishment
in the same one-digit occupational group14.
From column (1), it can be seen that over the seven-year period the unadjusted ￿rm-
speci￿c wage premium remains stable for men (around 32%) but decreases by almost
30% for women (from 34% to 24% ). Adding together individual and ￿rm characteristics
13For 1995 the same information used by Card and De la Rica (2006) is included, but for 2002 we also
add ￿nancial information at the industry level.
14Columns (1), (2) and (3) for 1995 were reported in Card and De la Rica (2006), but we show them
here for the sake of comparability. Models which include mean co-worker characteristics in narrower
occupational subgroups were ￿tted by Card and de la Rica (2006) for the EES-95 and no signi￿cant
di⁄erences were found.
12(column 2) increases the explanatory power of the model considerably and reduces the
coe¢ cients, suggesting that a striking proportion of the correlation between ￿rm-level
contracts and wages is due to systematic sorting of workers across ￿rms. For men the
adjusted premium is still positive and signi￿cant in both periods, but for women the
average ￿rm contract wage premium decreases from 0.12 in 1995 to zero in 2002. Adding
in co-worker characteristics (column 3) decreases the premium slightly for men but the
main features remain.
Several additional features arise from Tables 4 and 5. Belonging to a ￿rm with an
international product orientation increases wages particularly in 2002. The penalty for
holding a ￿xed-term contract decreases by 5-10% over this seven-year period for both
men and women. This could be one of the results of the reforms that took place in Spain
during the nineties, which tried to reduce the amount of this kind of contracting but also
to improve the conditions of those workers who had a ￿xed-term contract15. Co-worker
average characteristics have a signi￿cant, positive e⁄ect on individual wages. However,
the proportion of female co-workers a⁄ects wages di⁄erently depending on gender and
period. For men, working in women￿ s jobs decreased wages in 1995 by around 4 percent,
but this penalty had dissappeared by 2002. However, for women, working in women￿ s
jobs poses a big, increasing penalty (15 percent in 1995 and 18 percent in 2002).
5.2 Adding the Propensity Score
Our earlier considerations (in Section 3) suggested that the estimated wage e⁄ects
might be biased due to a non-random selection of ￿rms with unobservable characteristics
in the di⁄erent contracting regimes. Thus, in this paper one of the principal goals is to
control for unobserved heterogeneity arising from the side of the ￿rm. Since we have no
￿nancial information at establishment level which could give us an idea about the rents
of ￿rms in each reference year, we will try to ￿nd an alternative solution for this source
of heterogeneity. As in Card and de la Rica, following Imbens (2004) this problem can
be solved in two steps. First, we estimate the probability of a ￿rm o⁄ering a ￿rm-level
contract using a discrete choice model. This estimated probability for each establishment
is asigned to all individuals working at the same ￿rm. In the second step, we introduce
this variable as an additional regressor in the individual earnings equation.
15See de la Rica (2004) for a detailed analysis of the wage gap between workers with inde￿nite and
￿xed-term contracts.
13Table 6 shows the results of adding a third order polynomial function of the estimated
propensity score to the more general wage determination model covered in the previous
subsection. Although not reported, due to the similarity of the coe¢ cients, estimations
also include all covariates included in model (3) of Tables 4-5, that is, individual ob-
servable skills, job characteristics, average skills of co-workers, and indicators for region,
occupation and industry. If we compare Tables 4-5 and 6, adding the estimated probabil-
ity of a ￿rm-level contract decreases the premium associated to this kind of contracting
for both men and women, due in part to the fact that establishments o⁄ering ￿rm-level
contracts tend to have higher propensities. In 1995 the premium is still lower for men
than for women (5-7% respectively). In 2002 the coe¢ cient is lower but signi￿cant for
men (around 5%) and insigni￿cant for women. The propensity score is statistically sig-
ni￿cant in all cases. Summarizing, from 1995 to 2002, on average the premium decreases
for men and drops to zero for women
5.3 Analysis by Skill Group
In this section we try to determine whether the e⁄ect associated with ￿rm-level
contracting is di⁄erent for di⁄erent skill groups and whether it depends on the period
under study. This issue is even more relevant for the 2002 group of females, because we
￿nd that on average there is no signi￿cant e⁄ect of ￿rm-level contracting on women￿ s
wages. To adress these questions we ￿rst divide the wage distributions for men and
women into percentiles (the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th) for each year. Ordered probit
models (See Appendix Table A1) are then estimated separately by gender and period to
predict the probability of a given person being in any one of the ￿ve quintiles. These
predicted probabilities are used as weights and ￿ve separate models for each gender and
year are estimated.
Table 7 summarizes the estimated ￿rm-level contract premiums from four di⁄erent
wage determination models for 1995 and 2002. These di⁄erent models correspond to the
speci￿cations in Tables 4, 5 and 6, with model (4) being the most accurate speci￿cation,
adding in co-worker characteristics and a cubic in the estimated propensity score. Several
points common to 1995 and 2002 can be adressed from Table 7. For men, the estimated
e⁄ect of working under ￿rm-level contracts is roughly constant across wage groups when
we exclude any other observed covariates. But in speci￿cations (2)-(4) we ￿nd a tendency
14for a higher premium among higher paid workers. The results for women are similar to
those for men, although among women there is an even stronger tendency for the ￿rm-
level contracting premium to increase across the wage distribution.
A comparison of the two years, looking at the more general speci￿cation, shows that
premiums in 2002 are in general below those obtained 7 years earlier. For men, the
premium ranges from 5% to 9% between the lowest and highest wage quintiles in 1995,
whereas in 2002 it goes from 5% to 8%. The premium for the lowest-paid women is
almost zero in both periods, but in the top quintile of the wage distribution is nearly
10% in 1995 and 6% in 2002. In addition, while all premiums are statistically signi￿cant
for the 1995 sample, regardless of gender, after 7 years premium for women are only
found to be signi￿cant at the upper end of the distribution (quintiles 4 and 5), i.e. for
the highest paid females. This is consistent with the preliminary analysis carried out
at the beginning of the paper, where we found the highest wage dispersion in the 2002
sample of women, and higher premiums for older and more highly educated women.
In order to understand the higher drop in the adjusted premium for women compared
with that for men, we must take into account, as we mentioned above, that the sample
of women with ￿rm-contracts has gone through a signi￿cant compositional change over
this seven year period - in 2002, women with ￿rm-level contracts are much younger, with
a lower tenure, the percentage of them who in ￿rms with over 200 workers has increased
signi￿cantly and their presence in trade and other services has increased in detriment
of manufacturing. Our conjecture is that the di⁄erence in the adjusted wage premium
between men and women is partly capturing the unobservable compositional change in
the sample of women with ￿rm contracts. Otherwise the drop in the adjusted premium
should be similar for both genders.
Summarizing, two important conclusions can be drawn. The premium found for ￿rm-
speci￿c contracting is higher for more highly paid workers in both periods. This result
contrasts with the union wage premium in the United States and United Kingdom, which
is generally found to be lower for highly paid workers. In addition, ￿rm-level contracting
matters for all skill groups in 1995, but in 2002 it is not signi￿cant for less skilled women.
In the next section we extend this analysis using the new source of ￿nancial data available
for 2002.
155.4 Adding in ￿rm-performance information for 2002
5.4.1 Does the premium change when ￿nancial information is included?
The wage premium could still be re￿ ecting, at least partly, unobservable di⁄erences
among ￿rms. We have very little information about their economic performance, and
these unobserved di⁄erences might well be correlated with the ￿rm-speci￿c wage pre-
mium. In order to take into account this possible bias, we use a new source of data, the
Structural Statistics Business Survey, which allows us to introduce ￿nancial information
on some industries, although this information is only available for 2002. Thus, in this
section we test the sensitivity of the premium estimated to the new data and estimation
methods available. We construct some measures of economic performance in line with
the relevant literature and then choose the most suitable variables to include in the above
estimation of the propensity score16.
For a preliminary descriptive approach, Figure 6 shows the average log hourly wage
by type of contract and economic performance of industry for 2002. Industries are sorted
by volume of business (from lowest to highest -see Appendix for a list of industries). It
is revealed that mean wages ￿ uctuate considerably from one industry to another.17 The
￿gure suggests a positive correlation between workers￿wages and ￿rms￿ability to pay.
Dissagregation of Figure 6 by gender (not reported) reveals that this positive relationship
is very similar for both men and women. In addition, as seen above, wages are greater
on average when bargaining takes place at ￿rm level, regardless of the industry.
Since the raw data suggest a positive relationship between wages and pro￿ts, we set
out to check whether the premium associated with ￿rm-level contracting varies when this
￿nancial information is included. For our purpose, the most useful variables from this
survey are volume of business and the investment rate, per employee in both cases, in
logarithms and measured in 1995 euros for the sake of comparability. Volume of business
is de￿ned as the amounts invoiced by a company during the reference year in return for
the provision of services and sale of goods that are the object of its trading. Investment
16Instead of including them in the regression directly, we add them to the propensity score because in
that way we eliminate the bias arising from ￿rms￿unobserved heterogeneity. (Imbens 2004)
17The best paying industry is the electricity, gas and hot water supply sector. The results regarding
high and low paying industries are similar to those obtained by Plasman et al. (2006) for Belgium.
16can be described as the transfers carried out during the reference year to obtain goods
to be used in the long run in the company￿ s activity.18
These variables do not exactly measure the economic performance of industry, but
they may be considered as good proxies for it, and from an econometric perspective the
use of proxies enables us to avoid the endogeneity problem between pro￿ts and wages,
which are determined simultaneously in the wage equation. Other variables such as
gross operating surplus and a productivity indicator are available, but they are highly
correlated with investment and give the same estimate of the propensity score. Table
8 presents the results of the estimation when we include these variables together in the
propensity score.
The ￿rst point to be mentioned is that both variables are signi￿cant and both increase
the probability of having a ￿rm-level contract when they are included in the probit model
(See Appendix Table A2). As can be seen from table 8, the earnings regression coe¢ cient
associated with ￿rm-level contracting is still signi￿cant for men, and it is signi￿cantly
higher. For women, the premium was not signi￿cant before and including pro￿tability
of ￿rms does not change that result. Therefore, the main conclusion of this robustness
test is that the estimate of the propensity score has improved but the premium has not
changed substantially.
The next question to be answered in this section is whether the premium is still higher
for highly paid workers with the improvement in the estimation of the propensity score.
We carry out the analysis by quintile group for the more general speci￿cation (model 4)
substituting the new estimate of the p-score. Table 9 shows the results of this estimation.
We ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erences when comparing Table 9 with the corresponding rows
for 2002 in Table 7. Only the premium for women in the top quintile is signi￿cantly
higher (up from 5.5% to 6.6%) when the estimate of the propensity score that includes
￿nancial information at the industry level is used.
18The variable used as a proxy of economic performance by some studies in Belgium and England is
the investment rate. Other authors such as Abowd, Kramarz and Troske (2001) and Marsden (2005) use
the per capita value added as an instrument for dealing with the problem of endogeneity of pro￿ts in the
earnings equation.
175.4.2 Is there a rent component behind this premium?
There are several possible explanations for the positive wage premium associated
with ￿rm-level contracts. Workers covered by ￿rm-level contracts could be required to
work harder, raising the possibiltiy of the e¢ ciency wage premium explanation (Akerlof
1982; Weiss 1990). On the other hand, there is a growing literature in favour of the
rent-sharing hypothesis, showing that ￿rms share rents with their employees. Some
￿ndings from the Anglo-Saxon countries suggest that pro￿table ￿rms tend to pay higher
wages to their workers. For instance, Blanch￿ ower et al. (1996) using data for the
US manufacturing sector, shows that an increase in the industry￿ s ablility to pay rises
the long run level of wages. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) ￿nd the pro￿t per employee
elasticity of wages for the US to be around 0.3. Studies for European countries, such as
the analysis by Goos and Konings (2001) also support a positive correlation, ￿nding a
pro￿t per worker elasticity of wages of 0.1 for Belgium.
The availability of ￿nancial variables for 2002 may help us to test the hypothesis of
rent-sharing at least for this period. The rent sharing hypothesis in our framework sug-
gests that, through collective bargaining agreements, unions could be forcing large ￿rms
with positive ￿nancial results to share the rents obtained during the economic year with
their employees. To test for this, we add the two possible measures of economic perfor-
mance separately to the more general speci￿cation of the wage equation used in previous
sections, in order to analize the pro￿t per employee elasticity of wages. Interaction terms
between pro￿tability and contract status are also included to see whether the elasticity
is greater under ￿rm-level contracting. The results are shown in table 10.
We ￿nd a positive pro￿t per employee elasticity of wages of around 4-5% for men
and 3-4% for women. Moreover, the positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient of the interaction
terms (using both measures) reveals a greater elasticity in those establishments that o⁄er
￿rm-level contracts for both men and women. This result is consistent with the existence
of a rent-sharing component in the ￿rm contract wage premium in 200219. Card and de
la Rica (2006) support the rent-based explanation for the ￿rm contract wage premium
for 1995 for men, but not for women.
19Nevertheless, we advise some caution with this interpretation given that we cannot control perfectly
for ￿rm size (the ￿rm size variable is in intervals only), and ￿rm size is usually correlated with monitoring
costs. If monitoring costs are not adequately controlled for, we might not be able to disregard the e¢ ciency
wages explanation.
186 The impact of "centralization" on wage inequality
The last issue that we want to address is whether centralization in the wage bargain-
ing process has had any e⁄ect on wage inequality. Table 1 reveals that in this seven-year
period there has been a clear tendency towards centralization in the collective bargain-
ing process, illustrated by the decline in the fraction of workers covered by ￿rm-speci￿c
contracts compared to those covered by sectoral contracts. Regarding wage inequality,
table 3 reveals that (i) the overall dispersion of wages has decreased slightly for both
men and women, (ii) the variance of wages for both men and women with ￿rm-speci￿c
contracts has increased signi￿cantly, particularly for women, and (iii) the change in wage
dispersion for both men and women with other than ￿rm contracts is negligible. These
three facts lead us naturally to conclude that in the absence of centralization, the overall
wage dispersion in 2002 would have increased. We can try to assess the magnitude of the
impact of centralization on the decrease in wage dispersion over this seven-year period.
Following Gosling and Lemieux (2001) we show the e⁄ect of ￿rm contracts on wage in-
equality by performing a simple variance decomposition. One way of decomposing the
variance of wages is the following,
V ar(w) = ^ FV ar(w j Fj = 1) + (1 ￿ ^ F)V ar(w j Fj = 0) + ^ F(1 ￿ ^ F)￿2 (3)
where ^ F is the fraction of ￿rm-level contracts and ￿ is the wage premium associated
with ￿rm-level contracting, that is, E(w j Fj = 1) ￿ E(w j Fj = 0).
Table 11 shows the di⁄erent elements of this variance decomposition. We have com-
puted two counterfactual variances: The ￿rst one is shown in the 6th row, and presents
the variance that would prevail with the 2002 sample if the fraction of ￿rm agreements
remained at the 1995 level . The second counterfactual variance is constructed under the
assumption of no ￿rm-contracts in 2002. Such variance is presented in row 8.
From table 11 a clear conclusion emerges: If a centralization process of wage bargain-
ing had not taken place in Spain over this seven year period, the overall variance of wages
would have increased in almost two percent. Instead, the observed overall variance has
actually decreased in around one percent. Hence, centralization has led to a decrease in
overall wage variance of around three percent, and the magnitude is similar for men and
women. This result is in line with the ￿ndings of Teulings and Hartog (1998) or Blau
19and Kahn (2002), who show that the more centralized wage setting, the more compressed
the wage distribution is. In order to compare our results with those of the Anglo-Saxon
countries, we would have to accept, as Disney, Gosling and Machin (1996) point out, that
an employer￿ s decision to accept a ￿rm-speci￿c contract is comparable to the voluntary
union recognition process. They ￿nd de-unionization in the US and in the UK to be
an important factor in explaining the rise in wage inequality during the eighties in the
two countries. If ￿rm-contracts are comparable to unionization, then our results clearly
contrast with their ￿ndings. However, it is not clear that the process of ￿rm-contracting
is comparable to a union recognition process.
Section 5 lead us to conclude that the premium for ￿rm-speci￿c contracting is higher
for more highly paid workers, contrary to the union wage premium in the United States
and United Kingdom, which is generally found to be lower for highly paid workers. There-
fore, although there may be similarities between ￿rm-contracting and union recognition
process, we must be cautious when comparing the Anglo-Saxon deunionization with the
centralization process of wage bargaining.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides microeconomic evidence on the changes over time in the ￿rm-
speci￿c wage premium in Spain from 1995 to 2002, and on its impact on wage inequality.
We make use of two waves of a detailed linked employer-employee data set. In addition,
a new dataset with ￿nancial information on ￿rms is used for 2002 to control as ￿ exibly
as possible for di⁄erences in ￿rm performance (aggregated at industry level).
Descriptive comparisons across workers suggest that workers covered by ￿rm-level
contracts are older, more highly educated and tend to be working in the largest estab-
lishments. Looking at the descriptives, wages under ￿rm-speci￿c agreements are sys-
tematically higher for both periods. Using di⁄erent age-education cells, we see that the
premium associated with ￿rm contracts is a little higher for older and more highly ed-
ucated women, particularly in 2002. Stylized facts also reveal a clear tendency towards
centralization in the collective bargaining process in Spain over this seven-year period.
20Our results conclude that for men the adjusted ￿rm-level contract wage premium
has slightly decreased over this seven-year period (from 5.4 percent to 4.6 percent). In
addition, there is a signi￿cant drop in the adjusted average ￿rm-level contract wage
premium for women: in 1995 the average premium for women was around 7 percent,
but on average it drops to zero by 2002. In order to understand the higher drop in the
adjusted premium for women compared with that for men, we must take into account, as
we mentioned above, that the sample of women with ￿rm-contracts has gone through a
signi￿cant compositional change over this seven year period - in 2002, women with ￿rm-
level contracts are much younger, with a lower tenure, the percentage of them who work
in ￿rms with over 200 workers has increased signi￿cantly and their presence in trade and
other services has increased in detriment of manufacturing. Our conjecture is that the
di⁄erence in the adjusted wage premium between men and women is partly capturing
the unobservable compositional change in the sample of women with ￿rm contracts.
Otherwise the drop in the adjusted premium should be similar for both genders.
When we look at the overall wage distribution, it can be seen that for both men and
women in both periods, ￿rm-level contracts tend to raise wages more for more highly paid
workers, although for women in 2002, the ￿rm contract wage premium is only signi￿cantly
positive for women in the 4th and 5th quantiles of the wage distribution.
Finally, we measure the impact of wage centralization on wage inequality. As of 2002,
wage dispersion of workers, both men and women, covered by ￿rm-contracts is higher
than those covered by other contracts. Therefore, centralization in terms of a decrease
of ￿rm-contracts in favour of other contracts must naturally lead to a decrease in the
overall wage variance. We ￿nd that centralization of wage bargaining in Spain has led
to a decrease in wage variance of around 3 percent, similar for both men and women.
This result is in line with the ￿ndings of Teulings and Hartog (1998) or Blau and Kahn




Models for the Probability of Being in Di⁄erent Wage Quintiles
Men Women
Variable 1995 2002 1995 2002
Age 0.038 0.034 0.041 0.027
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.001)
Education 0.101 0.099 0.092 0.091
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Temporary Contract -0.839 -0.469 -0.721 -0.452
(0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.019)
Occupations
Managers and Technicians 0.601 0.787 1.075 1.133
(0.023) (0.024) (0.044) (0.033)
Clerical Workers 0.061 0.069 0.368 0.261
(0.023) (0.027) (0.032) (0.028)
Service Workers -0.409 -0.236 -0.016 0.243
(0.029) (0.028) (0.037) (0.029)
Quali￿ed Manual Workers -0.004 0.204 0.091 0.223
(0.016) (0.017) (0.029) (0.025)
Pseudo-R2 0.150 0.124 0.148 0.116
Number of Observations 100.533 89.320 29.637 40.056
Notes: Models are ordered probit models with ￿ve ranges based on unconditional quintiles
of gender speci￿c wage distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
22Industries according to NACE rev.1
A: Agriculture, hunting and forestry.
B: Fishing.
C: Mining and quarrying.
D: Manufacturing
DA: Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco.
DD: Manufacture of wood and wood products.
DE: Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products: publishing and printing.
DH: Manufacture of rubber and plastic products.
DJ: Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products.
DK: Manufature of machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
DL: Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment.
DM: Manufacture of transport equipment.
DN: Manufacturing n.e.c.
E: Electricity, gas and water supply.
F: Construction.
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and personal goods.
H: Hotels and Restaurants.
I: Transport, Storage and Communication.
K: Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities.
23Table A2
Probit Model for the Probability of having a ￿rm level contract
Variable 1995 2002
Average characteristics of the workforce
Age 0.162 0.065 0.121
(0.042) (0.060) (0.063)
Squared Age -0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Education 0.065 0.036 0.032
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
Occupational distribution by ￿rm
Managers and Technicians 0.928 1.122 0.693
(0.215) (0.266) (0.272)
Clerical Workers 0.487 0.322 0.933
(0.222) (0.315) (0.273)
Service Workers -0.428 0.833 0.910
(0.279) (0.285) (0.269)
Quali￿ed Manual Workers 0.521 0.843 0.503
(0.153) (0.237) (0.233)
Product Market Orientation
International market 0.151 0.252 0.038
(0.078) (0.122) (0.108)
Establishment Size Distribution
21-50 0.248 0.515 0.606
(0.114) (0.078) (0.088)
51-100 0.912 0.484 0.615
(0.132) (0.096) (0.104)
101-200 1.049 0.499 0.521
(0.130) (0.162) (0.188)
Over 200 2.114 1.788 1.902
(0.146) (0.079) (0.087)
Financial Variables at the Industry Level
Business Volume per employee 0.344
(0.085)
Investment per employee 0.541
(0.075)
Pseudo R2 0.389 0.336 0.425
Number of establishments 14.347 14.768 14.768
Notes: The individual explanatory variables are averaged over the characteristics of
the workforce at each establishment. Financial variables at the 2-digit industry level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
24Re-weighting procedure
Following the notation of the model presented in Section 4, the observed density of
wages in the subsample of workers covered by other contracts is given by
f(w j Fj = 0) =
Z
foc(w j x)f(x j Fj = 0)dx (4)
where foc(w j x) = f(w j x;Fj = 0): The distribution that would prevail if all workers
were paid under the wage structure of workers covered by other contracts would be,
foc(w) =
Z
foc(w j x)f(x)dx (5)
As shown in full detail by Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) this last equation can
be written as follows,
foc(w) =
Z
￿(x)foc(w j x)f(x j Fj = 0)dx (6)
A comparison of equations (4) and (6) indicates that the counterfactual density is
simply the "reweighted" version of the actual density of wages in the subsample of workers
covered by other contracts, where the sample weights are replaced by the weighting factor
￿(x), which is shown to be equal to ￿(x) = Pr(Fj = 0)=Pr(Fj = 0 j x). The numerator is
just the proportion of workers covered by non ￿rm-level contracts in the sample and the
denominator is the probability of belonging to this subsample of workers conditional on
the covariates, which is estimated using a probit model. The covariates used to estimate
the probit model consist basically of a ￿ exible functional form of human capital variables.
Once the weighting factor is constructed each worker i is weighted by ￿i = ￿(xi).
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28Table 1. Evolution of Collective Bargaining in Spain 1995-2002




1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
Total 7.605,1 9.696,5 1.043,7 1.025,9 13,72 10,58
Industry 2.525,0 2.751,9 451,1 409,8 17,9 14,9
Construction 821,7 1.117,1 8,224 6,84 1,0 0,6
Services 3.528,7 5.044,0 582,5 605,95 16,5 12,01
Source: Bolet￿n de Estad￿sticas Laborales
29Table 2A. Workers￿Characteristics by Type of Contract 1995-2002 - All Workers
All Contracts Firm-Speci￿c Other Contract
Independent variable 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
Fraction Male 0.77 0.69 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.68
Age Distribution
Under 30 0.25 0.29 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.30
30-44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.45
45-55 0.23 0.20 0.33 0.28 0.20 0.19
Over 55 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06
Education Distribution
Primary 0.34 0.30 0.35 0.21 0.34 0.31
Secondary 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.61 0.57 0.57
University 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.13
Fraction Temporary Contracts 0.27 0.27 0.10 0.11 0.32 0.29
Mean Tenure (years) 10.68 7.18 15.36 13.24 9.30 6.54
Establishment Size Distribution
11-20 0.20 0.44 0.05 0.08 0.24 0.48
21-50 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.30 0.16
51-100 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.17 0.09
101-200 0.15 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.03
Over 200 0.22 0.28 0.46 0.75 0.16 0.23
Industry Distribution
Manufacturing 0.65 0.48 0.84 0.59 0.59 0.47
Construction 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.11
Trade 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.12
Hotels 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.08
Transportation 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.05
Financial Services 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06
Other Services 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.11
Product Market Orientation
Local-Regional 0.86 0.88 0.77 0.75 0.88 0.89
International 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.25 0.12 0.11
Occupational Distribution
Managers and Technicians 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.31 0.13 0.18
Clerical Workers 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.12
Service Workers 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.11
Quali￿ed Manual Workers 0.48 0.42 0.53 0.42 0.47 0.42
Non-quali￿ed Manual Workers 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.15
Number of Observations 130,170 129,377 29,599 12,512 100,571 116,866
Notes: Samples are weighted and include all full time workers with valid information on key variables
in EES-95 and EES-02 for each year respectively.
30Table 2B. Women￿Characteristics by Type of Contract 1995-2002
All contracts Firm-Speci￿c Other Contract
Independent variable 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
Age Distribution
Under 30 0.36 0.35 0.24 0.34 0.39 0.35
30-44 0.47 0.45 0.54 0.44 0.45 0.45
45-55 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.16
Over 55 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Education Distribution
Primary 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.26 0.27
Secondary 0.64 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.58
University 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.09 0.15
Fraction Temporary Contracts 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.16 0.33 0.27
Mean Tenure (years) 8.69 5.59 13.01 8.86 7.81 5.33
Establishment Size Distribution
11-20 0.18 0.39 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.41
21-50 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.25 0.15
51-100 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.17 0.10
101-200 0.16 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.16 0.03
Over 200 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.80 0.21 0.32
Industry Distribution
Manufacturing 0.59 0.38 0.75 0.42 0.55 0.38
Construction 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Trade 0.15 0.18 0.07 0.24 0.16 0.17
Hotels 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.13
Transportation 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.04
Financial Services 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
Other Services 0.06 0.19 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.20
Product Market Orientation
Local-Regional 0.86 0.88 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.88
International 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.12
Occupational Distribution
Managers and Technicians 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.37 0.11 0.19
Clerical Workers 0.31 0.22 0.33 0.19 0.30 0.22
Service Workers 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.19 0.13 0.17
Quali￿ed Manual Workers 0.29 0.19 0.31 0.16 0.29 0.19
Non-quali￿ed Manual Workers 0.15 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.22
Number of Observations 29,637 40,056 5,033 3,001 24,604 37,055
Notes: Samples are weighted and include all full time workers with valid information on key variables
in EES-95 and EES-02 for each year respectively.
31Table 2C. Men￿Characteristics by Type of Contract 1995-2002
All Firm-Speci￿c Other Contract
Independent variable 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
Age Distribution
Under 30 0.21 0.26 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.27
30-44 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.45
45-55 0.26 0.22 0.36 0.31 0.23 0.21
Over 55 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.07
Education Distribution
Primary 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.23 0.37 0.32
Secondary 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.56
University 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.12
Fraction Temporary Contracts 0.26 0.28 0.08 0.10 0.31 0.30
Mean Tenure (years) 11.26 7.90 15.84 14.62 9.77 7.10
Establishment Size Distribution
11-20 0.21 0.47 0.05 0.09 0.25 0.51
21-50 0.26 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.31 0.17
51-100 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.09
101-200 0.15 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.13 0.03
Over 200 0.22 0.25 0.46 0.74 0.14 0.20
Industry Distribution
Manufacturing 0.67 0.53 0.86 0.64 0.61 0.51
Construction 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.15
Trade 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.10
Hotels 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
Transportation 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.19 0.07 0.06
Financial Services 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06
Other Services 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07
Product Market Orientation
Local-Regional 0.86 0.87 0.76 0.72 0.89 0.89
International 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.28 0.11 0.11
Occupational Distribution
Managers and Technicians 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.29 0.14 0.17
Clerical Workers 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08
Service Workers 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.08
Quali￿ed Manual Workers 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.51 0.53 0.53
Non-quali￿ed Manual Workers 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.11
Number of Observations 100,533 89,322 24,566 9,511 75,967 79,811
Notes: Samples are weighted and include all full time workers with valid information on key variables
in EES-95 and EES-02 for each year respectively.
32Table 3. Mean Log Wages by Type of Contract 1995-2002
Standarized Standarized
Mean Standard Mean Standard




Firm Contract 1.951 0.471 1.837 0.498
Other Contract 1.608 0.496 1.727 0.501
Men
Overall 1.745 0.509
Firm Contract 1.989 0.457 1.885 0.489
Other Contract 1.672 0.502 1.781 0.502
Women
Overall 1.472 0.454
Firm Contract 1.763 0.489 1.643 0.488




Firm Contract 1.987 0.524 1.945 0.524
Other Contract 1.661 0.487 1.856 0.541
Men
Overall 1.774 0.507
Firm Contract 2.070 0.487 2.032 0.498
Other Contract 1.735 0.497 1.932 0.543
Women
Overall 1.531 0.456
Firm Contract 1.748 0.552 1.715 0.522
Other Contract 1.511 0.429 1.658 0.481
Notes: For 1995, samples are 130.170 for all workers,100.533 for men and 29.637 for women.
For 2002, samples are 129.377 for all workers, 89.320 for men and 40.056 for women.
33Table 4. Log Wage Regressions for MEN
1995 2002
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Firm Contract 0.317 0.082 0.075 0.335 0.072 0.069
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016)
Worker·s Characteristics
Education 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Temporary Contract -0.199 -0.184 -0.106 -0.102
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Firm·s Characteristics
International Market 0.025 0.022 0.076 0.076
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
Publicly Owned 0.054 0.054 0.039 0.034
(0.055) (0.035) (0.030) (0.024)
20-50 Workers 0.070 0.070 0.086 0.085
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
51-100 Workers 0.134 0.134 0.102 0.102
(0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013)
101-200 Workers 0.149 0.151 0.149 0.151
(0.013) (0.010) (0.022) (0.019)
Over 200 Workers 0.219 0.220 0.156 0.156
(0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014)





Proportion under 30 -0.088 -0.035
(0.017) (0.019)
Proportion over 50 -0.111 -0.052
(0.020) (0.024)
Proportion Female -0.045 0.008
(0.016) 0.021
Intercept 1.672 1.244 0.743 1.735 1.372 0.809
(0.007) (0.022) (0.039) (0.007) (0.023) (0.046)
R-Squared 0.068 0.506 0.509 0.045 0.474 0.477
Notes: Sampling weights used for estimation. For 1995, samples are 100.533 for men. For
2002, samples are 89.320 for men. Standard errors are calculated with clustering by ￿rms.
All models except (1) also include controls for occupation, industry and region.
34Table 5. Log Wage Regressions for WOMEN
1995 2002
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Firm Contract 0.343 0.126 0.108 0.238 0.043 0.026
(0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.048) (0.030) (0.026)
Worker·s Characteristics
Education 0.022 0.017 0.024 0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Age 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.007
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Temporary Contract -0.173 -0.157 -0.109 -0.105
(0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm·s Characteristics
International Market 0.033 0.026 0.124 0.113
(0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
Publicly Owned 0.124 0.137 0.012 -0.0097
(0.041) (0.033) (0.043) (0.039)
20-50 Workers 0.029 0.025 0.071 0.061
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
51-100 Workers 0.081 0.067 0.064 0.052
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
101-200 Workers 0.120 0.096 0.129 0.110
(0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018)
Over 200 Workers 0.177 0.149 0.131 0.113
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014)





Proportion under 30 -0.036 -0.060
(0.021) (0.024)
Proportion over 50 -0.153 -0.104
(0.031) (0.036)
Proportion Female -0.156 -0.182
(0.015) (0.022)
Intercept 1.419 1.11 0.684 1.51 1.182 0.806
(0.007) (0.034) (0.060) (0.008) (0.045) (0.079)
R-Squared 0.074 0.494 0.506 0.022 0.432 0.447
Notes: Sampling weights used for estimation. For 1995, samples are 29.637 for women. For
2002, samples are 40.056 for women. Standard errors are calculated with clustering by ￿rms.
All models except (1) also include controls for occupation, industry and region.
35Table 6. Log Wage Regressions. p-score Added as a Regressor
1995 2002
Description Men Women Men Women
Firm Contract 0.054 0.067 0.046 0.007
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.022)
Propensity Score 0.663 0.019 0.967 0.901
(0.114) (0.146) (0.223) (0.372)
Squared Propensity Score -1.269 0.597 -0.736 0.720
(0.316) (0.413) (0.625) (0.986)
Cubed Propensity Score 0.847 -0.277 -0.019 -1.591
(0.242) (0.288) (0.548) (0.969)
R-Squared 0.512 0.514 0.480 0.461
Notes: Sampling weights used for estimation. For 1995, samples are 130.170 for all workers,
100.533 for men and 29.637 for women. For 2002, samples are 129.377 for all workers,
89.320 for men and 40.056 for women. Standard errors are calculated clustering by ￿rms.
36Table 7. Estimation of Firm-Contract Impact by Wage Quintile
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Model 1995
Men
Model (1) 0.253 0.267 0.257 0.241 0.222
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Model (2) 0.075 0.095 0.103 0.105 0.102
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Model (3) 0.064 0.085 0.094 0.098 0.098
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Model (4) 0.051 0.072 0.082 0.088 0.088
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Women
Model (1) 0.168 0.242 0.276 0.294 0.288
(0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
Model (2) 0.056 0.101 0.123 0.134 0.131
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Model (3) 0.037 0.077 0.098 0.112 0.113
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Model (4) 0.003 0.044 0.068 0.086 0.097
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
2002
Men
Model (1) 0.244 0.293 0.309 0.310 0.291
(0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Model (2) 0.077 0.097 0.101 0.098 0.084
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Model (3) 0.068 0.088 0.094 0.094 0.084
(0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Model (4) 0.051 0.071 0.078 0.081 0.080
(0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Women
Model (1) 0.122 0.172 0.219 0.274 0.316
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
Model (2) 0.037 0.056 0.070 0.083 0.095
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)
Model (3) 0.022 0.039 0.052 0.063 0.075
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Model (4) 0.002 0.011 0.023 0.037 0.055
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Notes: Models (1)-(3) corresponds to speci￿cations in Tables 4-5. Model (4) corresponds
to speci￿cations in Table 6. Sampling weights used for estimation. Standard errors are
calculated with clustering by ￿rms.
37Table 8. Turnover and Investment added to the former p-score 2002
Description Men Women
Firm Contract 0.055 0.009
(0.017) (0.024)
Propensity Score 0.825 0.679
(0.162) (0.322)
Squared Propensity Score -1.751 -0.181
(0.473) (0.844)
Cubed Propensity Score 1.190 -0.072
(0.375) (0.617)
R-Squared 0.482 0.447
Notes: Sampling weights used for estimation.Financial variables at the 2-digit
industry level. Estimation also includes all covariates of model (3) of Tables 4-5
Standard errors are calculated with clustering by ￿rms.
Table 9. Estimation of Firm-Contract Impact by Wage Quintile for 2002
Model (4) Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Men 0.050 0.071 0.078 0.082 0.074
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Women 0.004 0.012 0.024 0.041 0.066
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Note: Sampling weights used for estimation. Speci￿cation (4) is estimated with the
new propensity score. Standard errors are calculated with clustering by ￿rms.
38Table 10. Log Wage Regressions adding pro￿tability and the interactions 2002
Variable Men Women
F. Contract 0.055 0.055 -0.347 0.003 0.009 0.009 -0.513 -0.158
(0.017) (0.017) (0.128) (0.038) (0.024) (0.024) (0.145) (0.068)
Financial var.
B. Volume 0.054 0.042 0.034 0.023
(per employee) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Investment 0.045 0.041 0.027 0.024
(per employee) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Interactions
F.Contract * BV 0.088 0.116
(0.026) (0.030)
F.Contract * Inv. 0.028 0.082
(0.016) (0.038)
Propensity 0.878 0.837 0.855 0.826 0.705 0.679 0.657 0.647
(0.187) (0.189) (0.185) (0.189) (0.319) (0.323) (0.316) (0.321)
Squared Prop. -1.887 -1.759 -1.774 -1.698 -0.267 -0.178 -0.094 -0.045
(0.463) (0.472) (0.457) (0.474) (0.832) (0.844) (0.820) (0.845)
Cubed Prop. 1.307 1.187 1.112 1.101 0.011 -0.075 -0.303 -0.331
(0.348) (0.358) (0.352) (0.365) (0.603) (0.615) (0.586) (0.064)
Notes:Sampling weights used for estimation.Samples are 89.320 for men and 40.056 for women
Models used the covariates of speci￿cation (4), and include controls for occupation and region.
Financial variables at the 2-digit industry level.
Table 11. Variance decomposition of log wages 1995-2002
Men Women
1995 2002 Change 1995 2002 Change
1. Variance ￿rm-contract 0.209 0.237 0.028 0.239 0.305 0.066
2. Variance other contract 0.252 0.247 -0.005 0.182 0.184 0.002
3. Firm-contract wage di⁄erential 0.317 0.336 0.019 0.344 0.238 -0.106
4. Fraction with ￿rm level contracts 0.228 0.116 -0.112 0.152 0.084 -0.068
5. Overall variance 0.260 0.257 -0.003 0.206 0.199 -0.007
6. Variance with 1995 ￿rm contracts 0.260 0.265 0.005 0.206 0.218 0.012
7. "Centralization" e⁄ect -0.008 -0.019
8. Variance without ￿rm contracts 0.260 0.247 -0.013 0.206 0.184 -0.022
Notes: For 1995, samples are 130.170 for all workers, 100.533 for men and 29.637 for women.
For 2002, samples are 129.377 for all workers,89.320 for men and 40.056 for women. The
"centralization" e⁄ect is computed as the di⁄erence between the change in rows 5 and 6.
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